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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Robert Furgess, an inmate in a Pennsylvania state 
prison, suffers from a disability and was unable to take a 
shower for three months because the prison staff did not 
provide him with a handicapped-accessible shower facility.  
He subsequently brought claims against the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections (PDOC) under Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act (RA).  Both the ADA and the RA 
require public entities, including state prisons, to provide, in 
all of their programs, services, and activities, a reasonable 
accommodation to individuals with disabilities.  The District 
Court dismissed Furgess’s complaint with prejudice on the 
ground that, under case law from the United States District 
Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania, the provision 
of showers is not a program, service, or activity under the 
ADA or the RA.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate 
the District Court’s dismissal of Furgess’s complaint and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
  
I.1 
 Furgess has myasthenia gravis (MG), a neuromuscular 
disease that inhibits his ability to see, walk, speak, and lift.  
He arrived at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, 
Pennsylvania, (SCI Albion) in 2014 and requested 
                                              
1 This recitation of the facts accepts as true the well-pleaded 
allegations of Furgess’s complaint, as required upon 
reviewing dismissal on a 12(b)(6) motion.  See McTernan v. 
City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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accommodations for his disability.  SCI Albion subsequently 
provided him with an accessible shower stall, moved his cell 
closer to the medical and dining halls, and fitted him for leg 
braces.  On December 10, 2015, Furgess was moved to the 
Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) at SCI Albion,2 which was 
not equipped with handicapped-accessible shower facilities.  
Furgess repeatedly requested to be provided with an 
accessible shower but he was not.  By February of 2016, 
Furgess had not taken a shower.  The SCI Albion staff alerted 
RHU Lieutenant Barner of Furgess’s disability, but Furgess 
still was not provided a shower.  By March 2016, the 
Superintendent of SCI Albion had become aware that Furgess 
had not been able to shower.  He questioned Lieutenant 
Barner.  Barner told the Superintendent that the staff would 
escort Furgess to the infirmary shower facilities, which were 
accessible.  The staff did not, however, do so.  On March 7, 
Furgess filed a grievance, requesting a handicapped-
accessible shower facility.  Although his grievance was 
rejected, he was moved to a handicapped-accessible cell but 
he still was not provided access to a shower.  On March 16, 
for the first time in over three months, Furgess was escorted 
to a shower.  Unfortunately, the shower was not handicapped-
accessible.  The staff gave Furgess an armless plastic chair on 
which to sit during the shower.  Because the hot water 
exacerbated the symptoms of Furgess’s MG, he tried to leave 
the shower room.  Due to the lack of rails or safety bars, he 
slipped and was knocked unconscious.  As a result of this fall, 
                                              
2 The complaint does not indicate why Furgess was moved to 
the RHU and, in their briefs, the parties dispute whether he 
was transferred for disciplinary or non-disciplinary reasons.  
The reason Furgess was housed in the RHU is irrelevant to 
our analysis of his claims, as discussed in Section III(B).   
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he has been confined to a wheelchair and suffers from 
headaches and back pain.  Furgess filed another grievance on 
March 25 claiming that he had been denied accommodation 
for his disability.  The grievance was denied on April 18. 
 
Furgess brought this action against the PDOC, alleging 
it violated his rights under Title II of the ADA and Section 
504 of the RA by failing to provide him with an accessible 
shower.  The PDOC moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), arguing that Furgess had failed to state a claim 
because a shower is not a “service, program, or activity” 
under either statute.  The District Court agreed and dismissed 
Furgess’s complaint with prejudice.   
 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our review of an order granting a motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is plenary.3  We accept all factual 
allegations as true and determine whether “under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.”4 
 
III. 
We consider the Title II and Section 504 claims 
together because “the substantive standards for determining 
                                              
3 Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 
2008).  
4 Id. at 233.  
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liability are the same.”5  To state a claim under either the 
ADA or the RA, Furgess must allege that he is a qualified 
individual with a disability, who was precluded from 
participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise 
was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability.6  
Furgess must also show intentional discrimination under a 
deliberate indifference standard because he seeks 
compensatory damages.7  The PDOC does not contest that 
Furgess is a qualified individual with a disability.  It only 
cursorily defends the District Court’s holding that showers 
are not programs, services, or activities.  Its primary argument 
on appeal is that Furgess was not denied a shower “by reason 
of” his disability.  Rather, according to the PDOC, he was 
deprived of a shower because he was housed in the RHU, 
which did not have accessible shower facilities.  
 
Our analysis proceeds in two parts.  First, we address 
whether the provision of showers is a program, service, or 
activity under Title II and Section 504.  Next, we turn to the 
                                              
5 McDonald v. Com. of Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare Polk  Ctr., 
62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995).  
6 Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila. Bd. Of 
Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 n.19 (3d Cir. 2009). 
7 S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 
248, 263 (3d Cir. 2013).   
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PDOC’s central argument, that Furgess did not suffer the 
deprivation of a shower due to his disability.8  
A. IS THE PROVISION OF A SHOWER A PROGRAM, 
SERVICE OR ACTIVITY? 
 
The District Court dismissed Furgess’s complaint on 
the ground that the PDOC’s alleged failure to accommodate 
his disability did not preclude him from participating in a 
program, service, or activity because showers are not a 
program, service, or activity.  The District Court’s 
conclusion, and the cases supporting it, are contrary both to 
the statutory language of the RA and the ADA and to the 
weight of case law.   
 
Looking first to the statutory language, Section 504 of 
the RA defines a “program or activity” quite broadly to 
include “all of the operations of” a state instrumentality.9  We 
have confirmed these terms’ broad meaning, calling them 
“all-encompassing.”10  The ADA does not define “services, 
programs, or activities,” but both Congress and this Court 
have recognized that Title II provides at least the same degree 
                                              
8 The PDOC does not contest that Furgess has exhausted his 
administrative remedies, or that state prisons are subject to 
the ADA and the RA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A) (any 
“department, agency, special purpose district, or other 
instrumentality of a State or local government” is subject to 
the RA); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 
206, 210 (1998) (state prisons are subject to the ADA).  
9 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (emphasis added).   
10 Yeskey v. Com. of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 170 
(3d Cir. 1997), aff’d sub nom. 524 U.S. 206 (1998). 
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of protection as Section 504.11  Thus, the phrase “service, 
program, or activity” under Title II, like “program or activity” 
under Section 504, is “extremely broad in scope and includes 
anything a public entity does.”12  A prison’s provision of 
showers to inmates fits within this expansive definition, as it 
undoubtedly is something “a public entity does” and is one 
“of the operations” of the prison.   
 
Indeed, Department of Justice guidance on Title II 
regulations explicitly refers to a prison’s provision of hygiene 
as being included under the statute’s purview.13  Specifically, 
the DOJ explains that corrections systems are unique facilities 
under Title II because inmates cannot leave, and thus prisons 
must address the needs of inmates with disabilities by 
providing “accessible toilet and shower facilities, devices 
such as a bed transfer or a shower chair, and assistance with 
hygiene methods for prisoners with physical disabilities.”14   
 
The weight of the case law also supports our 
conclusion that the provision of a shower is a service, 
program, or activity.  First, in Jaros v. Illinois Department of 
Corrections,15 the Seventh Circuit held that meals and 
                                              
11 The ADA should not be “construed to apply a lesser 
standard than the standards applied under [the RA].”  42 
U.S.C. § 12201(a); see also McDonald, 62 F.3d at 94-95.   
12 Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2015). 
13 We accord these regulations “controlling weight unless 
[they are] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”  See Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 171. 
14 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, at 663 (2017).   
15 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012).  
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showers made available to inmates are programs or activities 
under Section 504.16  Second, in providing examples of what 
constitutes a program or activity that prisons provide to 
inmates, the Ninth Circuit listed “toilet[s] and bathing 
facilities.”17  Third, the First Circuit reversed a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for a prison on the grounds that 
an issue of material fact remained as to whether prison 
officials prevented an inmate from using a showering chair, 
implying that the provision of showers is a program, service, 
or activity under Title II.18  Finally, in dictum, the Supreme 
Court has stated that a prison’s refusal to accommodate 
inmates’ disabilities “in such fundamentals as mobility, 
hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison 
programs” constitutes a denial of the benefits of a prison’s 
services, programs, or activities under Title II.19   
 
The District Court, along with the three decisions from 
the Western District of Pennsylvania it relied on, failed to 
engage in any statutory or regulatory analysis in holding that 
showers are not programs, services, or activities.  Rather, 
these decisions improperly relied on a Seventh Circuit case, 
Bryant v. Madigan.20  In Bryant, an inmate claimed that a 
prison violated the ADA when it (1) failed to install 
                                              
16 Id. at 672 (“Although incarceration is not a program or 
activity, the meals and showers made available to inmates 
are.”).   
17 Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th 
Cir. 2010).  
18 Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 287-88 (1st 
Cir. 2006).  
19 United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).   
20 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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guardrails on his bed, and as a result, he fell out of bed and 
broke his leg due to leg spasms caused by his paraplegia, and 
(2) denied him pain medication for his broken leg.21  The 
court characterized both allegations as ones of improper 
medical treatment of his paraplegia and held that the inmate’s 
claims failed because “[t]he ADA does not create a remedy 
for medical malpractice” in prisons.22  The court went on to 
explain that “incarceration, which requires the provision of a 
place to sleep, is not a ‘program’ or ‘activity.’  Sleeping in 
one’s cell is not a ‘program’ or ‘activity.’”23  Similarly, the 
Western District of Pennsylvania cases characterize the 
failure to provide an accessible shower as medical treatment 
and conclude that showers are not programs, services, or 
activities.24   
 
The problem with these cases’ analysis is that 
complaints about not being provided an accessible shower are 
not allegations of medical malpractice or disagreements about 
medical treatment.  They are requests for reasonable 
                                              
21 Id. at 247-48.  
22 Id. at 249.  
23 Id.  
24 Thomas v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 615 F. Supp. 2d 411, 427 
(W.D. Pa. 2009); see also Harris v. Giroux, No. CV 16-38, 
2017 WL 3075099, at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2017) (holding 
that plaintiff failed to state a claim because showers are not 
programs or activities) (citing Thomas, 615 F. Supp. at 414); 
Evans v. Rozum, No. CIV.A. 07-230J, 2008 WL 5068963, at 
*9-10 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2008) (holding that being denied an 
accessible shower does not state a claim as a matter of law 
and stating “[s]imilarly here, showering, defecating, etc., is no 
more a program or activity than is sleeping”).  
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accommodations so that inmates with disabilities can take a 
shower—just like able-bodied inmates.  Tellingly, the 
Seventh Circuit itself has not relied on Bryant when deciding 
if showers constitute programs, services, or activities.  As 
noted above, the Seventh Circuit answered this question in 
the affirmative in Jaros. 
 
We conclude that provision of showers is a part of the 
programs, activities, or services referred to in the ADA and 
the RA.  
B. DID FURGESS SUFFER DISCRIMINATION 
BECAUSE OF  
HIS DISABILITY? 
 
Next, we address the PDOC’s primary argument on 
appeal—that Furgess has not alleged he suffered 
discrimination “by reason of his disability.”  The PDOC 
contends that Furgess was deprived of a shower because his 
own misconduct landed him in the RHU, which lacked 
accessible shower facilities, not because the PDOC 
intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his 
disability.  It is not clear whether the PDOC’s argument goes 
to causation, intent, or both, but either way, its argument is 
unconvincing.  Furgess’s complaint alleges both causation 
and the requisite intent, deliberate indifference.  
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As to causation, the sole cause of Furgess’s 
deprivation of a shower was his disability.25  The PDOC’s 
argument to the contrary fails because it conflates the alleged 
discriminatory action—failure to accommodate by not 
making the RHU showers handicapped-accessible—with the 
causation element of Furgess’s claims.  In other words, the 
PDOC’s transfer of Furgess to the RHU cannot serve as a 
superseding or intervening “cause” of the lack of a shower 
that would defeat his claims.   
 
The PDOC tries to convince us that Furgess was in the 
RHU because of a disciplinary infraction, and that but-for his 
alleged misconduct, he would not be in the RHU and thus 
deprived of a shower.  But the reason why Furgess was 
housed in the RHU is irrelevant.  A prisoner’s misconduct 
does not strip him of his right to reasonable accommodations, 
and a prison’s obligation to comply with the ADA and the RA 
does not disappear when inmates are placed in a segregated 
housing unit, regardless of the reason for which they are 
housed there.  As the ADA’s regulations make clear, the 
PDOC’s failure to equip the RHU with accessible showers 
                                              
25 Causation standards are different under the ADA and RA—
under the RA, the disability must be the sole cause of the 
discriminatory action, while the ADA only requires but-for 
causation.  CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 n.11 
(3d Cir. 2013).  Based on the facts as alleged in the 
complaint, Furgess has sufficiently alleged causation under 
both standards.  
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does not excuse the prison from its duty to reasonably 
accommodate prisoners with disabilities.26   
 
Furgess has also alleged intentional discrimination, 
which, in this Circuit, may be satisfied by a showing of 
deliberate indifference.27  Under this test, Furgess must allege 
that (1) the PDOC had “knowledge that a federally protected 
right is substantially likely to be violated,” (i.e. knowledge 
that the failure to provide Furgess with an accessible shower 
likely violated his right to reasonable accommodations of his 
disability), and (2) the prison failed “to act despite that 
knowledge.”28   
 
As to the first prong, there are multiple allegations that 
the PDOC knew about Furgess’s need for an accessible 
shower facility.  First, at the time that Furgess was held in the 
                                              
26 28 C.F.R. § 35.152(b)(1) (“Public entities shall ensure that 
qualified inmates or detainees with disabilities shall not, 
because a facility is inaccessible to or unusable by 
individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation 
in, or be denied the benefits of, the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any public entity.”) (emphasis added). 
27 S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729 F.3d at 263 (“We now follow in 
the footsteps of a majority of our sister courts and hold that a 
showing of deliberate indifference may satisfy a claim for 
compensatory damages under § 504 of the RA and § 202 of 
the ADA.”).  The PDOC acknowledges that this is the 
standard to show intentional discrimination, but it discusses 
discriminatory animus throughout its brief, only mentioning 
deliberate indifference in a footnote. 
28 Id. at 265. 
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general prison population, he requested and was granted an 
accessible shower stall.  Second, after he was placed in the 
RHU, he requested an accessible shower multiple times.  
Third, the medical staff as well as the RHU Lieutenant and 
the Superintendent knew that Furgess had not been able to 
shower because the RHU showers were not handicapped-
accessible.  It is clear from the above that the PDOC knew 
that Furgess required a handicapped-accessible shower and 
that by failing to provide him with one, his right to a 
reasonable accommodation of his disability was likely to be 
violated.  The second prong, failure to act, is also adequately 
pled.  For three months, the PDOC did not provide him with 
any accommodation that would allow him to shower; when 
they did bring him to a shower, it was not handicapped-
accessible.  We conclude that these allegations constitute 
deliberate indifference.  
 
The PDOC cites Thomas v. Pennsylvania Department 
of Corrections,29 in which the plaintiff claimed that the prison 
violated the ADA by providing him with a replacement 
prosthetic leg that was inferior to his old one.30  The district 
court held that the replacement prosthetic was a reasonable 
accommodation of his disability, and even if the prosthetic 
was “inferior,” the prison’s provision of the prosthetic was 
not “by reason of his disability” because the Department of 
                                              
29 615 F. Supp. 2d 411 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
30 Id. at 423-24. 
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Corrections provides only one type of prosthesis.31  Thus, 
Thomas was accommodated without discrimination, and we 
find it distinguishable.   
 
For the above reasons, we hold that Furgess has 
adequately alleged that he was denied a shower “by reason 
of” his disability and that the PDOC was deliberately 
indifferent in failing to provide him with a handicapped-
accessible shower.  
 
IV. 
We vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Furgess’s 
complaint and remand for further proceeding consistent with 
this opinion.  
                                              
31 Id. at 425-26. The PDOC also cites Strongminger v. Brock, 
which is an unpublished case from the Seventh Circuit; it 
held, under a summary judgment standard, that the inmate’s 
claim failed because the “prison’s actions rose at worst to the 
level of negligence.” 592 F. App’x. 508, 511-12 (7th Cir. 
2014).  This case is distinguishable from Furgess’s case and, 
at any rate, not binding on us.   
